In Depth Analysis
New Civil Status Law Raises Concerns Over Identity Cards and HLP Rights
On 1 March, the Syrian People’s Assembly updated the nation’s Civil Status Law. Although the update can be seen as a procedural refresher, it has sparked concerns inside Syria and abroad that it will leave Syrians without the means of renewing critically important national ID cards unless they can physically enter Government of Syria areas. The Government of Syria has downplayed these fears, yet worries over the law’s potential to disenfranchise and dispossess Syria’s displaced and refugee populations have persisted.
Whole of Syria Update
Attention gravitated to Article 54 of the law, which deals with the renewal of personal identity cards, as a result of reporting by the Syrian Arab News Agency, which singled out the article in its coverage of the update. Article 54 stipulates that identity cards remain valid for 10 years, and they must be replaced not less than 30 days and not more than six months prior to their expiry. Many Syrians are currently unable to renew their identity cards because they live abroad or they reside in areas of Syria where there is no access to Government of Syria civil institutions. The potential impact of invalidating the IDs held by such individuals could be staggering. Inside Syria, national ID cards are critical for accessing government services, making property-related transactions, and receiving NGO-administered aid. For Syrians in neighboring states, the ID cards often serve as a primary travel document. If IDs were invalidated, it would create the grounds for potential property concerns on a level not mooted since the introduction of Syria’s most notorious reconstruction-related laws, Law No. 10 and Decree No. 66.
However, there is reason to doubt such a sweeping interpretation of the article is on the cards — at least for the time being. Article 54 recapitulates terms spelled out in the 2007 Civil Status Law, which were suspended when the Government of Syria opted not to issue new identity cards. Indeed, the validity of national ID cards may be extended on the basis of force majeure by decision of the minister of interior. On 2 March, the Ministry of Interior issued a clarification stating that identity cards currently in use will remain valid until the Government of Syria announces the issuance of a new style of ID. For Syrians, that is cold comfort. Plans have circulated for a new ID format that will reportedly support biometric data, and it will link to the status of criminal charges against the cardholder, introducing further legal barriers to movement and access to services. Although it is not clear when the new IDs will be issued, rollout will once again revive the concerns now circulating over Article 54.
Who would be affected by the decision?
For many Syrians, the ID card — which is issued to citizens when they reach 14 years of age — represents their only proof of identification. Many Syrians do not hold passports. As a result, a particular concern pertains to those who entered Lebanon using only their ID. It is unclear whether the introduction of a new identity card will prohibit them from re-entering Syria in the future. Additionally, the ID card is the key to accessing services and navigating Syria’s bureaucracy, and it serves as a prerequisite for the issuance of other government documents and certificates. Crucially, identity cards are necessary for housing, land, and property (HLP) transactions. Affected individuals may be locked out of HLP dealings, such as selling their property or legally appointing a sponsor to manage their assets.
The new law therefore raises acute worry over the properties of displaced individuals, a chief concern of the Syria response. As such, the law may have a disproportionate negative impact on the large number of former opposition supporters who were forcibly displaced as a result of military activities or reconciliation. Identity cards are also presumed to be crucial for voting, including in the presidential election this year. Bringing in new identity cards and invalidating old ones prior to upcoming elections risks disenfranchising Syrians who reside outside of Government-controlled areas or live abroad. If the Government were to facilitate access to IDs for Syrians abroad, it would likely use this step as a show of goodwill to legitimise the electoral process.
Currently, ID renewal requires physical return to Government-controlled areas in Syria, and Syrian embassies do not renew such cards for Syrians abroad. However, if the Government of Syria were to begin issuing IDs through embassies, it would likely do so with the hopes of generating revenues. ID renewal inside Syria costs approximately 1,000 SYP; given that the law does not specify the renewal process for Syrians outside the country, the Government has latitude to impose substantial renewal costs, as it has done with the issuance of passports and other documents, which routinely cost hundreds of dollars (see: Syria Update 21 December 2020).
Keeping tabs on the population
This new Civil Status Law came into force shortly after the Ministry of Interior reached a decision that eases the process for acquiring other civil documentation (see: Syria Update 1 March 2020). The decision effectively removed the conditions that prevented individuals with outstanding charges to apply for new civil documentation. However, this Ministry of Interior decision is unlikely to prompt the Syrian population to apply for missing documents or new identity cards, especially given that they need to interact with the state to secure such documents; those who avoid interaction with the Government out of fear of reprisal or detention are, thus, incapable of benefitting from such decrees. It is quite possible that the Syrian Government, by amending the Civil Status Law, is looking to formalise and digitise information about citizens, whether residing in Syria or abroad – thus increasing the ease with which the population can be surveilled, monitored, and monitised. Moreover, the furor generated by the event echoes the public outrage caused by ambiguous statements by public officials concerning the confiscation of properties earlier this year. Many Syrians viewed the earlier confiscation rumours as a cynical ploy to push draft dodgers to sell their properties rather than risk confiscation (see: Syria Update 22 February 2021). All told, the events demonstrate that – regardless of intent – low trust in Government institutions will make these legal updates hard to implement.
Whole Of Syria Review
MSF Suspends Activities in Wake of Deadly Fire in ‘Unsafe’ Al-Hol Camp
Security deterioration prompts MSF to temporarily halt aid in the camp
Al-Hol camp, Al-Hasakeh Governorate: On 24 February, a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff member was killed in a tent in al-Hol camp by unknown actors, according to the organisation. Separately, on 27 February, a fire broke out in a tent where camp residents were celebrating a wedding ceremony, resulting in the deaths of at least seven people. The 4-year-old daughter of an MSF staff member was killed, along with three other children. The fire injured 70 people, including three MSF staff members and 15 children. Subsequent reports indicate that two individuals injured in the fire have since died.
These events come only weeks after a UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights urged 57 countries to repatriate their nationals residing in al-Hol, in light of security incidents and unabated killings, which contribute to conditions that “may well amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under international law” (see: Syria Update 15 February 2021). As per its 2 March announcement, MSF have temporarily suspended outreach activities within al-Hol camp, including medical assistance and several water and sanitation programmes. Relatedly, on 3 March, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) barred the entry of a French delegation, comprising 4 MPs, to al-Hol. The delegation was reportedly intending to visit the camp to check on the status of French nationals residing in al-Hol.
MSF’s temporary suspension of activities offers a glimpse of further access challenges to come as security conditions worsen, plunging the camp’s estimated 64,000 residents into further misery. According to media reports, at least 31 people have been killed in al-Hol camp since the beginning of 2021, of whom the majority were reportedly shot; given that 35 people were killed in the camp in all of 2020, this represents a grisly deterioration. The actors behind the killings remain unknown. While some attribute the incidents to Islamic State (IS) affiliates and sleeper cells, it is important to avoid affixing the IS label carelessly. Doing so shuts down debate and can justify both indifference and draconian approaches that prioritise perceived security interests above all other considerations, including humanitarian need and legal principles. Some observers have blamed the violence in part on tribal and interpersonal score-settling between residents of the camp. To the extent that this is true, the continued return of al-Hol residents to their home communities in Syria may be an important pressure release valve, but it will not be a papancea, given the camp’s large foreign population. In addition to deliberate violence, al-Hol has also experienced the fallout of accidental and unintended incidents — such as cooking-gas fires — which are sometimes passed off as security incidents by camp residents seeking money from online supporters of IS, while the SDF itself also has incentive to trumpet the dangers as it seeks greater international support.
Calls to evacuate children from the camp have intensified following the deadly fire, with UNICEF urging countries to repatriate the children of foreign nationals. However, barriers will be difficult to overcome, especially for those who have attained the age of majority. On 26 February, the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court ruled that Shamima Begum, a British national who joined IS in 2015, could not return to the UK to challenge that government’s decision to strip her of citizenship. This ruling may set a precedent for the fate of foreign nationals residing in the camp, particularly Britons. But it should not distract from the fact that the camp population remains overwhelmingly composed of children and women, only a small fraction of whom are thought to be committed IS supporters. Approaches to repatriation, return, and reintegration must therefore factor in this reality. Meanwhile, deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in the camp shows no signs of abating, especially given the suspension of programmes and rising concerns over the spread of COVID-19.
Danish Immigration Authorities Strip 94 Syrian Refugees of Residency Permits
Denmark is the first EU country to deem Damascus safe for return
Denmark: On 25 February, media sources reported that 94 Syrian refugees had either been stripped of their Danish residency or refused renewal in the past year. The 94 are some of a reported 461 Syrians determined by the Danish authorities to have come to Denmark from the Damascus area. After a screening process, the immigration authorities reportedly stripped these people of the right to live in Denmark, because they deem Damascus and Rural Damascus to be safe for return. As in other countries of asylum, the status of Syrians in Denmark is a flashpoint issue that has split domestic political parties.
Out of the frying pan, into the fire
Denmark has yet not voiced plans to return the affected refugees to Syria, although they will reportedly be moved to camps inside Denmark, widely seen as a first step toward eventual deportation. Stripping Syrians of residency permits plunges them into legal, economic, and social limbo, and it sends a warning to other would-be asylum-seekers.
The move has Denmark is the first EU state to determine that the Damascus area is safe for return. Certainly, violent conflict has diminished in Syria, particularly around Damascus and especially so since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet other conditions in the country have worsened at an accelerating pace. Economic misery has ballooned and social conditions have deteriorated as services falter and the Syrian state veers toward collapse. Denmark’s decision advertises that it is not a stable place for relocation; this approach may well discourage Syrians from seeking refuge in the country in the future. There is a risk that other EU states will follow suit, setting off a domino effect that will leave Syrians with fewer options as they seek so-called durable solutions to escape the grinding misery that permeates Syria. Despite the political salience of refugee issues in Europe and elsewhere, the European Asylum Support Office reports that asylum claims dropped 31 percent in 2020. At 14 percent, Syrians accounted for the largest proportion of applicants. That said, COVID-related shrinking of asylum claims should not be taken as a new normal, particularly in the case of Syria. Conditions in Syria are such that further pressures to migrate are in all likelihood growing.
Damascus Declares Russia Will Provide Wheat Aid (Again)
Past wheat aid from Russia has frequently fallen short
Damascus: On 1 March, media sources reported that the Syrian ambassador to Russia had announced that an agreement recently signed between Russia and Syria would provide Syria with shipments of Russian wheat, oil derivatives, and other goods needed to fill the “needs of the Sryian people” via a “long-term line.” Ambassador Riad Haddad stated that the first shipments were set to arrive in Damascus, Homs, and Hama governorates throughout March and April. A separate agreement has also been reached between Syria and Turkey, mediated by Russia, which will allow the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army to transfer grain reserves to Government-controlled areas in Aleppo.
Short-term solutions to a long-term problem
Food insecurity and wheat shortages in Government of Syria–controlled areas in particular have been a priority concern for the international community for more than a year. Such concerns are especially acute now, given that roughly two-third of Syrians have been declared food insecure, according to WFP. That said, it is not immediately clear how much wheat aid Russia will provide. Haddad’s statement suggests that basic needs would be met, yet it is worth noting that earlier promises for such support from Russia have gone unfulfilled. On the contrary, in late 2020, it was reported that Russia had deliberately withheld wheat aid as a means of pressuring the Syrian Government — although its exact aims were unclear. Indeed, Russia’s apparent willingness to stand by as ordinary Syrians suffer has been a chief criticism launched at Moscow by the Syrian street. Reaching a deal to support Syrians’ needs now may be a means for Moscow to whitewash its image, quell criticisms, and reduce social tensions ahead of the presidential elections. Likewise, the volume of wheat expected to reach Government-held areas via Turkey is expected to be modest. That said, both wheat deals hint that further cooperation to put bread on the table in Government-held areas are possible.
Telecom Trouble as MTN Comes into Asma Al-Assad’s Orbit
The fate of Syria’s second-largest provider is evidence of the First Lady’s ambitions
Various Locations: On February 25, the Damascus Administrative Court placed Syrian telecommunications operator MTN in curatorship, on charges that it had violated the terms of its license and failed to fulfil its financial commitment toward the state — namely turning over 21.5 percent of its profits. The court decision places MTN under the effective control of Teleinvest. Teleinvest already owns 25 percent of MTN Syria’s shares and it has been involved, since August 2020, in negotiations to purchase MTN Global’s share in the company — a 75 percent stake — for $65 million. In May 2020, the Syrian Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (STRA) demanded that MTN and Syriatel, the country’s two telecoms operators, pay 233 billion SYP in recompense for alleged fraud (see: Syria Update 4 May 2020). Both firms initially refused to pay up, and Syriatel was brought under state control soon thereafter as its chief, Rami Makhlouf, was felled in a struggle for influence within Syria’s ruling Assad regime. MTN paid a token 1.25 billion SYP, nonetheless leaving it with a massive deficit that is among the main reasons for the latest court decision.
Asma, telecom kingmaker
Within a period of less than seven months, Syria’s two telecoms operators have been brought under direct control of the Government of Syria. The latest decision buoys Teleinvest, a company under the management of the Ibrahim family — specifically Nisreen (who is under U.S. sanction), Rana, and Yasser — which is believed to be close to First Lady Asma al-Assad. The fall of Rami Makhlouf and Syriatel and the suspected capture of MTN by individuals close to al-Assad are evidence of the First Lady’s interest in telecoms, which is among the most profitable sectors in Syria. MTN registered profits of 1.6 billion SYP in the third quarter of 2020, following the Syriatel crackdown. The apparent skullduggery at play in syrian telecommunications is evidence of the potential for regime-linked figures to use power and prominence to seize the upper hand in profitable sectors. It is also indicative of the risks that exist for foreign investors. Such events may be a disincentive to investment of the type that will be needed to halt the country’s economic collapse and provide sustainable labour growth in a post-conflict environment.
Russia Destroys ‘Cave’ Hospital in Hama’s Kafr Zeita
The ‘most secure health facility in Syria’ is demolished
Kafr Zeita, Hama Governorate: On 1 March, Russian media agency Zvezda News published a video showing Russian forces blowing up the Cave Central Hospital (rebranded in 2016 to become the Martyr Dr Hassan Muhammad al-Araj Hospital) in Kafr Zeita, northern rural Hama. The hospital, which has been known at times as al-Kahif or al-Maghara, was located inside an artificial cave set inside a rocky outcropping. It was established in 2015, due to the need in opposition areas for a fortified healthcare facility protected from Russian and Government of Syria bombardment. Roman Bismartni, the head of the Russian engineering forces, said that “destroying the hospital aims to prevent its being used again in the future.” He added: “This is one of the most equipped places found by the Russian forces. It is a modern hospital receiving outpatients, carrying out complex operations, and accommodating up to 100 people.” The hospital was vacated, and its equipment and staff members relocated to Idleb Governorate, before the Government of Syria retook control of Kafr Zeita, in August 2019.
End of a era
The hospital was among the most effective in Syria’s opposition-controlled areas, serving more than 50,000 people and carrying out around 150 medical operations per month. Its destruction by Russia is not only a powerful blow to the civil infrastructure that buttressed the armed opposition, it also embodies the approach by Russia and the Government of Syria to the health sector in opposition-controlled areas. During the conflict, healthcare facilities have been among the most heavily targeted sites in northwest Syria in particular, while healthcare workers have been among the groups most marginalised public workers in communities recaptured by the Government, as additional restrictions have been imposed on employing health workers or re-opening health facilities in such areas (see: What Remains?: A Postmortem Analysis of the Cross-Border Response in Dar’a). Between 2016 and 2019, the Cave Central Hospital, which was funded by the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), was deliberately bombed at least five times by Russia and the Government of Syria (in April 2016, October 2016, April 2017, February 2018, and May 2019). One bombing led to the death of Hasan al-Araj, the former head of the Free Hama Health Directorate.
The hospital’s destruction is altogether worrying. By demolishing the Cave Central Hospital, the Government of Syria seems to be seeking to annihilate the capacity of local communities to undertake governance activities in parallel to the Government in future. Undermining facilities and structures built during the period of opposition control is particularly worrying now, given the growing need for such capacity, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
After Tafas Meeting, Louka Agrees to Release 30 Detainees
Detainee releases are good PR before upcoming elections
Tafas, Dar’a Governorate: Local and media sources reported that, on 27 February, Hussam Louka, the director of Syria’s General Intelligence and head of the Security Committee, agreed to release 30 detainees, during a meeting between the Central Negotiations Committee and the Security Committee and the Russian Army in Tafas city, western Dar’a. The agreement came in response to the negotiation committee’s request for the release of 57 detainees. Local sources indicated that the agreement came during a routine meeting to discuss the general situation in Dar’a, though it also touched on the detainees’ file. Such meetings are a direct result of the February military escalation in Dar’a Governorate, which ended with an agreement between the Central Negotiations Committee and the Security Committee (see: Syria Update 15 February 2021).
Additionally, local and media sources reported security tension in Jasem city, northern Dar’a, where the State Security Branch arrested a former opposition commander, Wael Khalil al-Jalm. Al-Jalm was refused reconciliation during a new round of deals in the area several months ago. Following his arrest, local armed groups surrounded State Security Branch fighters inside their headquarters in the Jasem culture centre, in an effort to force the release of the commander. According to local sources, Hussam Louka and notables of Jasem intervened to reduce the tension and secure the release of the detainee.
Dar’a remains unreconciled
The Syrian Government — with Russian support — is seeking stability and community acceptance of its presence in southern Syria, seen as an imperative ahead of upcoming presidential elections. However, its efforts to achieve these goals are still viewed as being largely superficial and ineffective. Security chaos and instability have become the most prominent features of the landscape in southern Syria. Dar’a Governorate recorded more than 30 assassinations and attempted assassinations in February, mostly targeting former members of the opposition and security and military officers affiliated with the Government. The Syrian Government continues to fall short of meeting the terms of the fragile 2018 reconciliation agreements; it remains consequential that authorities have failed to follow through on the release of detainees, while they continue to bar former state employees from returning to work. The latest detainee releases advanced by Louka are emblematic of the Syrian Government’s approach to the detainee releases, which it has carried out only incrementally and only when needed as a bargaining chip with the Central Negotiations Committee. That said, the latest release is limited in scope and does nothing for the detainees whose fate was at issue at the time of reconciliation.
Self-Administration Announces Plan to Divide Deir-ez-Zor into 4 Cantons
The move is important, but its potential impact is less certain
SDF-controlled Deir-ez-Zor Governorate: On 24 February, media sources reported that the Self-Administration will divide SDF-controlled areas of Deir-ez-Zor Governorate into four cantons. These cantons will reportedly be run by semi-independent administrations. Reportedly, the Self-Administration decided to take this step in order to appease the Arab tribes in the region, in light of the protests against the SDF. The four cantons will reportedly be managed by administrations composed of 42 members from the local community, who will be elected according to a list put forward by the Deir-ez-Zor Civil Council.
Changes in the works
The SDF-held portions of Deir-ez-Zor in the middle and lower Euphrates River Valley are among the most intensely conflict-affected areas of Syria, and they are viewed as a linchpin of donor-supported stabilisation and counterterror initiatives. Any change to administrative procedures, entry points, or access will be of foremost concern to aid implementers. The administrative partitioning offers the Self-Administration an opportunity to respond to local criticism of the SDF, as cleaving the area into smaller, semi-independent cantons creates space for more localised authority. However, this strategy is unlikely to pave over existing inequities in the region. It is still unclear how these administrative changes will unfold. Local sources indicate that the true impact of the initiative will not be clear for some time.
That said, any change will have potential impact for the international Syria response, given the importance of the region itself. The area is home to the most important oil reserves in Syria. It has also witnessed the greatest incidence of IS-linked attacks in the northeast writ large. Devolution of administrative authorities to local actors can be construed as a concession to local grievances against the Kurdish-dominated Self-Administration, but implementation may be a hard sell. The area in question is the least receptive to the Self-Administration’s ruling paradigm and ideology. Any administration in the area must contend with fervid social and tribal tensions; assassinations and feuds are common.
Open Source Annex
The Open Source Annex highlights key media reports, research, and primary documents that are not examined in the Syria Update. For a continuously updated collection of such records, searchable by geography, theme, and conflict actor, and curated to meet the needs of decision-makers, please see COAR’s comprehensive online search platform, Alexandrina, at the link below..
Note: These records are solely the responsibility of their creators. COAR does not necessarily endorse — or confirm — the viewpoints expressed by these sources.
European Document Rejects 2021 Syrian Presidential Elections
What Does it Say? European countries are holding meetings to approve a document that stipulates their rejection of the 2021 Syrian elections, which are based on the 2012 constitution.
Reading Between the Lines:
Russia and Iran are hoping that the 2021 election will herald a shift in the international view of Syria. That is unlikely. Western actors must determine how to balance a principled approach against the pragmatic reality that leverage to shape events inside Syria is highly limited.
Source: Asharq Al-Awsat Language: English Date: 2 March 2021
Hourly Black Market Exchange Rates and Gold Prices in Syria By City
What Does it Say? The tool charts the black market exchange rate for the Syrian pound on an hourly basis.
Reading Between the Lines: The tool is a useful compendium for those following the crisis, particularly as Syria’s currency continues to depreciate, driving up the price for safe haven currencies and alternatives such as gold.
Source: Karam Shaar Language: English and Arabic Date: 4 March 2021
Salary Statistics for Groups in Syria: The Difference a Between Doctorate-Holder and a High-School Graduate is Only 7,000 SYP
What Does it Say? The article spells out the floor and ceiling salaries for public-sector wages in Syria.
Reading Between the Lines: The holder of a high school diploma can earn a monthly salary of 50,430 SYP, while a doctorate-holder will start at 57,495 SYP. Both salaries amount to less than $20, evidencing the dire economic situation and the abysmal value of the Syrian currency.
Source: SP Today Language: Arabic Date: 3 March 2021
A Decade of Destruction: Attacks on Healthcare in Syria
What Does it Say? Healthcare facilities are protected under international law, however, in Syrian they have become one of the most feared locations as they have repeatedly come under attack. According to the WHO, around 70 percent of the healthcare workforce has fled the country as a result.
Reading Between the Lines: The remaining healthcare workers face a significant lack of medical equipment, medicine, and access. Donor funding could mitigate some of these hurdles, while there is a concern that unless skilled healthcare workers can be brought into the workforce in the country, further programming entry points and opportunities will disappear.
Source: International Rescue Committee Language: English Date: 2 March2021
Arbitrary Imprisonment and Detention: Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Syrian Arab Republic
What Does it Say? The extensive report documents significant human rights abuses, detentions, and torture, which it says is being conducted by both the Government of Syria and smaller groups.
Reading Between the Lines: Disappearances and detentions are prolonging suffering for hundreds of thousands of families, some of whom have not heard from their relatives in nearly 10 years. Detention remains a foremost concern for Syrian communities. Resolving detainee issues will be a necessary first step for stabilising conflict-affected communities and, perhaps some day, achieving justice and reconciliation.
Source: United Nations Human Rights Council Language: English Date: 2 March 2021
Damascus Receives 2.1 Billion SYP Parking Allowance
What Does it Say? The director of transport in Damascus announced an agreement with a private company to create a parking system in order to rationalise the city’s frenetic parking situation and produce revenue for the Government.
Reading Between the Lines: The Government is trying to come up with many projects in order to generate revenue; this parking system is just the latest one.
Source: Watan Language: Arabic Date: 1 March 2021
Erdogan-bashing Kurdish Advocacy Group Lobbies Biden for Reset with Syrian Kurds
What Does it Say? The non-profit Justice for Kurds group hired a law firm to lobby the Biden administration, hoping to secure a more favourable partnership with the SDF than was seen under the Trump administration.
Reading Between the Lines: The Kurdish lobbying group is likely attempting to gain the favor of the Biden administration in order to avoid a repeat of the 2019 Turkish Invasion of northeastern Syria. The group claimed that Erdogan’s imperial ambitions extend, “beyond crushing the Kurds, to harassing practically all of Turkey’s neighbors in a bid to re-establish a new Ottoman Caliphate.” The SDF will find a more sympathetic audience in the Biden administration, but how exactly such support will materialise remains unclear.
Source: Foreign Lobby Language: English Date: 16 February 2021
One Month Since Autonomous Administration Stopped Fuel Supplies to Syrian Regime
What Does it Say? The Self-Administration has stopped selling oil to the Government of Syria, likely at the behest of the U.S.
Reading Between the Lines: The SDF’s willingness to comply with Washington’s preference to isolate the Government of Syria suggests that the Self-Administration has greater confidence in continuing U.S. support, which will be vital as it risks antagonising Damascus by denying cross-line oil sales.
Source: Enab Baladi Language: English Date: 27 February 2021