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Acronyms

Central Bank of Libya (CBL)
Counter-Terrorism Force (CTF)
Department for Combating Illegal Immigration (DCIM)
General Administrations for Coastal Security (GACS)
General Administration for Security Operations (GASO)
General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL)
Government of National Accord (GNA)
Government of National Unity (GNU)
General Security and Security Deployments Agency (GSA)
General Staff of the Libyan Army – GNA (GSLA)
High State Council (HSC)
House of Representatives (HoR)
Law Enforcement Force Directorate (LEFD): Idarat Quwat Infadh al-Qanun

Law Enforcement Force Directorate (LEF): Quwat Fardh al-Qanun
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)
Ministry of Defense (MoD)
Ministry of Health (MoH)
Ministry of Interior (MoI)
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
National Mobile Force (NMF)
Special Operations Force (known as Nawasi) (SOF)
Deterrence Agency to Combat Terrorism & Organized Crime (DACOT, formerly Special Deterrence Force SDF)
Stabilization Support Agency (SSA)
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion (TRB)
Territorial control in Libya as of July 2021

TERRITORIAL CONTROL
- Government of National Unity
- Low populated
- Unaffiliated local control
- Libyan National Army
- Low populated
- Fragile tribal support

POPULATION DENSITY¹
- Capital (1,220,000+)
- City (100,000+)
- Town (20,000+)
- Mostly uninhabited (0-50 people/km²)

¹UN OCHA (2020)
National Events

LPDF Fails to Establish Constitutional Basis ahead of December Elections

Overview

National elections planned for December 2021 are at risk of being postponed as the acting Libyan authorities failed once more to reach a consensus on constitutional procedures, a few months from the decisive milestone. After electing the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) Presidential Council and Prime Minister Abd Alhamid Aldabaiba in February 2021, the 74 representatives of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) were tasked with agreeing on a constitutional basis for the presidential and legislative elections. Having failed to reach a consensus on several occasions earlier this year, the representatives met to revisit the issue in early July over a three-day session in Geneva, Switzerland. Various political and military forces are expected to exploit the elusive elections as an excuse to pressure and undermine the GNU, further inflaming divisions.

Context

Once again, the LPDF’s Legal Committee failed to agree upon a legal framework for the elections. Twenty members proposed an amendment to hold a referendum on the draft constitution before the presidential elections, and others within the LPDF’s Legal Committee made motions on a plethora of issues including the candidates’ backgrounds. Some of the new proposals were consistent with the initial roadmap, while others were a departure, such as the referendum on the constitution or holding representative rather than direct elections. Because of these disagreements, the three-day session concluded without a vote on the constitutional basis. If no agreement has been reached at least three months prior to the elections, it is likely they will be postponed past December, or even cancelled, thus prolonging the GNU’s mandate.

Meanwhile, the speaker of the House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, has stressed that the elections do not hinge solely on the LPDF’s process and jurisdiction. Saleh even threatened to form a parallel government in the eastern region should the elections not take place in December. However, it is likely he is using the threat as a psychological cudgel against the GNU.

Potential candidates for the presidency decried the possible postponement of the elections. These include Aguila Saleh, Libyan National Army (LNA) General Commander Khalifa Haftar, former Minister of the Interior Fathi Bashagha (a Misratan), Commander of the Western Military Zone Osama al-Juwaili (a Zintani), and Zawia congressman Ali Buzriba. All of them are eager to see the elections take place sooner rather than later, as they have strong bases of support that inspire high hopes for success.

Impact

The potential for the GNU’s mandate to be prolonged undermines its legitimacy and acceptance by the population and politico-military actors. If the elections do not take place in December, the GNU will face serious challenges and risks becoming obsolete, exacerbating rather than helping resolve the conflict, as was the case with the Government of National Accord (GNA) (2016-2020). Any postponement would deepen the divisions between those aspiring to run and those seeking to reschedule.

THE COASTAL ROAD BETWEEN MISRATA AND SIRTE REOPENED AFTER 19 MONTHS OF CLOSURE

Meanwhile, one positive development was the long-awaited reopening of the Coastal Road between Sirte and Misrata on 30 July after several failed announcements. One of its first direct consequences was a decrease in the price of commodities as drivers are no longer incurring further expenses on fuel and logistics traveling between the eastern, western, and central regions of the country.

Saleh and Haftar bargain over the GNU’s budget

Overview

Following more than a year of discord between Aguila Saleh and Khalifa Haftar, eastern Libya’s two most important figures are once again allies — this time over the GNU’s budget. After months of uncertainty, it has become clear that the budget approval hinges on allocating extra financial resources to the LNA’s General Command.

Context

In the sessions held in Tobruk on 4-5 July in the presence of the Prime Minister Aldabaiba, the HoR once more failed to adopt a budget resolution for 2021. The main stumbling block concerned provisions for extra funding requested by the LNA, which Aldabaiba, seemingly under pressure from the western camp, has not yet approved. Saleh has stated that the GNU does not need such a large budget (around 84 billion LYD) for the few remaining months before it is slated to hand over power to the new authority elected in December.

Yet the reasons for Saleh’s obstruction (one of the main obstacles to the adoption of the new budget) are to be found elsewhere. In a mid-July meeting in ar-Rajma between Saleh and Haftar, Ar-Rajma declared that the parliament would not pass the budget without the inclusion of an ad-hoc allocation to the LNA’s General Command apparatus (comprising Khalifa Haftar and his inner circle).2 In his capacity as Speaker of the HoR and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces affiliated with the eastern authorities, Saleh created the position of General Command in March 2015 and tailored it for Khalifa Haftar, who was then leading the HoR-backed Operation Dignity against the Benghazi Revolutionaries’ Shura Council. However, the General Command does not exist in the Libyan military organisation, and has not been officially incorporated by the GNU, although the latter recognises the LNA’s and Haftar’s de facto authority. This situation demonstrates the limits of the GNU’s strategy of placating competing groups and papering over institutional flaws rather than taking concrete steps toward sustainable solutions.

Aguila Saleh’s preoccupation with saving public funds evaporated when Aldabaiba finally agreed to increase the budget proposal to 111 billion LYD in early August to accommodate requests for additional funding, including the LNA’s. The recent domestic and international mediations between Aldabaiba and the LNA’s leadership may have facilitated this compromise. However, at the time of writing, the budget is still being discussed within the HoR and there are no clear indications that it will be adopted. According to COAR’s sources, the LNA’s leadership is still unhappy with the 2.5 billion LYD increase, which falls well short of the 6-7 billion originally requested.

Impact

The HoR’s non-adoption of the GNU’s budget hinders more than the GNU’s ability to govern or implement a coherent strategy — it also heavily impacts the functioning of state institutions and fund allocations to regions and communities in need.

The approval of the proposed budget’s first chapter, which pertains to public salaries, has helped to reduce the pressure on the government and employees. However, negotiations over the rest of the budget, which is necessary for basic operations, equipment, development, and emergency funding, remain stalled. Until a budget is approved, the GNU may finance its operations through month to month resolutions, as did its predecessor the GNA, which faced similar obstacles.

The HoR’s non-adoption of the GNU’s budget hinders more than the GNU’s ability to govern or implement a coherent strategy — it also heavily impacts the functioning of state institutions and fund allocations to regions and communities in need.

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2 It is worth noting that most LNA’s manpower and equipment expenses are already included in the GNU’s budget proposal. This additional request would cover the cost of the auxiliary forces affiliated with the LNA but not formally recognised by the state payroll system. According to its detractors, this may also serve to finance Haftar’s own political and military ambitions.
COVID-19 situation

Overview
Partly due to a global surge in the highly transmissible Delta variant, Libya has recorded an unprecedented increase in daily COVID-19 deaths and infections over the past month.\(^3\) The country’s fragile health system, lacking in both medical infrastructure (testing and isolation centres) and equipment (respirators, oxygen, and PCR tests, especially in the south), is unable to cope. COVID-dedicated hospitals and medical centres are overcrowded and unable to treat critical cases, let alone patients with other conditions, including those with chronic diseases.

Context
The pending budget approval has a significant and direct impact on the health system, particularly given that the emergency clause includes COVID-19 response provisions. Political and military parties are taking advantage of the urgent situation to pressure Aldabaiba into capitulating to their demands.

Although Aldabiaba has reiterated his commitment to prioritising the COVID-19 response, he has so far taken paltry measures to limit the spread of infections. A 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. partial curfew has been implemented in many western and central cities from 26 July until further notice. The curfew was not extended to the eastern region, which continues to rely on LNA-affiliated institutions formed in 2020 to combat the pandemic, despite being under the GNU’s nominal authority. In addition, the Libyan government has closed the air and land borders with neighbouring Tunisia, which has seen a major deterioration of the COVID-19 situation.

Because the national authorities were unable to contain the outbreak, the GNA, and now the GNU, decided to offload the COVID-19 response onto the municipal authorities. Municipalities in the western region such as Zawia, Subrata, Surman, and al-A’jeilat took concerted measures to enforce full or partial curfews in their respective jurisdictions. However, the curfews, which are designed to be in place for 5-10 days, are barely respected by the local authorities and population after the first day. In Misrata, schools and public spaces have been closed following a surge in positive cases among pupils, and the COVID testing unit at Misrata Medical Centre stopped its operations on 17 July as its entire staff had been infected.

\(^3\) During the week of 12-18 July, an average of roughly 2700 cases per day has been declared positive out of an average of 5800 daily testings.

Impact
In addition to health sector consequences, the strain brought on by surging COVID-19 caseload may have political consequences. The fear and panic resulting from the spread of the virus may push actors who control medical resources or centres to prioritise access for their own constituencies if national authorities cannot satisfy local needs.

Western Region

Tripoli

Overview
On 22 July, clashes erupted on Zawia Street between armed units affiliated with two major security actors in Tripoli, namely the Stabilisation Support Agency (SSA) and the Deterrence Agency to Combat Terrorism and Organized Crime (DACOT). The incident was part of a continued struggle by armed groups for dominance and territory in the Libyan capital.

The clashes left one child dead, and two other civilians injured, all of whom were local residents. The exchange of fire endangered not only key nearby medical facilities, such as the Tripoli Central Hospital, but also two important migrant detention facilities, including one that specifically caters to women and children.

Meanwhile, the continued expansion within the capital of the 444th Fighting Brigade, a close ally of DACOT, risks exacerbating tensions with other Tripolitan armed groups, particularly SSA components. The Brigade took over two military bases in Tripoli during the past month, and will likely continue to expand its footprint.

Context
The groups involved in the incident were elements of the Administration for Operations and Judicial Security under the DACOT’s influence, and the 92nd Battalion, linked with the SSA-affiliated Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB). Tensions have escalated between the DACOT and the SSA due to the recent dramatic growth in capacity of the latter’s armed groups. This is perceived as a threat by the DACOT, which until recently was considered Tripoli’s most powerful faction apart from external actors such as Misrata and Zintan. There has been a build-up
of clashes culminating in yesterday’s skirmish. The most recent involved forces directly affiliated with the DACOT and ‘Ghneiwa’ after multiple rounds of revenge detentions and kidnappings of members of the two opposing forces.

The fighting had subsided by the morning of 23 July. The clashes did not escalate into a full-blown conflict involving all of the SSA’s and the DACOT’s forces, which would have had a massive impact in terms of human and material damages. An investigation was initiated by the authorities to determine the circumstances that led to this event and the subsequent death of a local child.

Impact

Zawia Street, located in the very centre of Tripoli, is one of the most vital axes connecting different parts of the capital. This densely populated commercial area is also home to several official buildings, all within a one-kilometre radius. Therefore, the clashes may interrupt the functioning of state institutions, as well as hinder mobility. The roads in the area were blocked during the fighting.

Equally important, Zawia Street is home to one of the most important hospitals in the capital, the Tripoli Central Hospital, as well as various clinics and public COVID-19 detection and isolation centres, the latter of which has a 200-bed capacity. The medical centres were closed for several hours during yesterday’s clashes. The resumption of gunfire in such a strategic area would not only impact access to healthcare at a critical time when COVID-19 cases are rising daily, but would also risk affecting the patients currently housed in the medical centres.

It is worth noting that the TRB has some influence over Zawia Street’s branch of the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), a processing centre used to hold captive women and child migrants and refugees. If the DACOT takes control of the area — which is at present unlikely — control over these DCIM offices would also switch hands, potentially impacting humanitarian access to them.

27km Checkpoint Incident

Context

On 30 July, skirmishes erupted between the SSA-allied 55th Battalion and Mohamed Bahroun’s force from Zawia near the 27km checkpoint on the Coastal Road, west of Tripoli. Properties in the nearby al-Maya locality were damaged and several families were trapped in their houses as a result of the conflict. The Libyan Red Crescent organised the safe evacuation of more than 60 families. Local armed groups have clashed on multiple occasions in the areas surrounding Zawia, including al-A’jeilat, Subrata, and Surman.

Impact

As tensions build between the two Zawian actors in western Libya, the potential for further clashes in the area is high. Zawia is one of western Libya’s most populous cities, and given the presence of major military and security bases, clashes in the city often occur along the two most densely populated streets in the city.

As noted, the Libyan Red Crescent has successfully organised safe evacuation of at least 60 families who were confined to their houses in al-Mayah during the 30 July clashes. Private and public properties located in the conflict area were damaged. Such clashes could also cause further closures of the Coastal Road, west of Tripoli. The section around the 27km checkpoint was blocked during the clashes, seriously restricting traffic between the capital, the coastal cities (e.g., Zawia, Subrata, Surman, Zuwara), and the Tunisian border. Consequently, motorists would be compelled to take a more dangerous route through Warshafena region, an area known for crime.

As tensions build between the two Zawian actors in western Libya, the potential for further clashes in the area is high.

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4 Such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Courthouse, the Libyan Passport, Immigration and Foreigners Affairs Authority, the headquarters of the National Oil Corporation, the Libya Post, the Libyan Post, and the Information Telecommunication Company (LPTIC), which is under the 92nd Battalion.

5 The 27km checkpoint, roughly halfway between Janzour and Zawia, west of Tripoli, is considered the main entrance to the capital from the northwest. Located in the al-Maya locality in the Warshafena region, the checkpoint is controlled by Muammar al-Dhawi, head of the 55th Battalion.
Southern Region

Sabha

Overview

High-level delegations from the LNA and the GNU visited the southern region in late July. The visits may have been coordinated to facilitate a reconciliation between the two parties, which were in disagreement over various dossiers at the national and local levels.

Several tribal mediation efforts were held between the southern constituencies under the auspices of both the LNA and the GNU. At the hyper-local level in Sabha, tribal reconfigurations are still playing out following Masoud Jeddu’s shift from the LNA toward the GNU. A delegation from Jeddu’s tribe, the Awlad Suleiman, met with Khalifa Haftar at his Benghazi headquarters in early July with the aim of finding common ground.

Context

On 24 July, the LNA General Command sent a military delegation to the south, headed by its Chief of Staff, Major General Abdulrazaq al-Nadhouri, accompanied by Khalifa Haftar’s son, Saddam.\(^6\) The official purpose of the visit was to tour LNA military camps and headquarters in the southern regions it controls.

The visit’s timing, however, suggests another purpose. The following day, Prime Minister Aldabaiba, accompanied by a ministerial delegation, also visited Sabha.\(^7\) The GNU and the LNA delegations were both received by Mugarha tribe elders in Sabha. Although initial analyses characterise the LNA’s visit as an assertion of their dominance in the south, it seems that the visit was coordinated with the GNU in order to negotiate. The relationship is sometimes tense, but the two camps have managed to collaborate so far.

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6 The delegation was received by Mabrouk Sahban al-Magarhi, the commander of the LNA Southern Operations Room, currently the highest-ranking LNA officer in the south and the de facto Southern Military Region commander, a position that remains vacant.

7 It is worth noting that during his visit to Sabha, Dabaiba held the first ministerial meeting in the south since 2011.
Currently, units affiliated with the GNU’s Minister of Interior carry out the security functions in the south, while the military forces are almost exclusively under the LNA’s command.

Meanwhile, the GNU is also attempting to assert its presence in the southern region through its own tribal mediations to gain social acceptance and legitimacy. On 26 July, tribal figures from the south met in Tripoli to sign the ‘Fezzan Forum for Peaceful Coexistence and Social Harmony’ pact in the presence of the two deputies of the GNU’s Presidential Council, Moussa al-Kouni (south), and Abdullah al-Lafi (west). However, the ‘forum’ has been rejected by many parties, especially those with LNA sympathies. For example, the LNA-aligned Council of Tuareg Elders in Libya argued that those who signed do not represent their communities, but only themselves. In fact, these groups’ objections are politically motivated as most of the signatories are closer to the western camp or at odds with the LNA. Meanwhile, the predominantly Ahali and LNA-aligned Council of Elders of Murzuq did not attend, stating that Hamed Brikaw, deputy of the High State Council and Ali Wardhabo, head of the GNU-aligned Steering Council of Murzuq, both Tubu, do not represent Murzuq.

Impact
While tribal meditations to ease tensions between rival communities should be encouraged, a peace agreement will not be reached if only one conflict party is invited to participate. National parties’ exploitation of local rivalries further complicate the situation and make an agreement harder to reach. Given their disagreement with the LNA, the aforementioned figures invited to the mediations in Tripoli may become potential allies for the GNU if deep political divisions resurface.

Eastern Region

Tobruk

Overview
In early July, Prime Minister Aldabaiba travelled to Tobruk, the seat of the HoR, to discuss the budget approval, but to no avail. Aldabaiba’s second visit to Tobruk and the eastern region in general is in lieu of his long-awaited visit to Benghazi, hindered by tensions with the LNA’s leadership and its sympathisers on the ground. It is also an opportunity for the Prime Minister to build new alliances with local actors in the east.

Context
Upon his arrival in Tobruk, Aldabaiba was received by the deputy Minister of Interior, Faraj Egaim, whose group provided the delegation’s security throughout its day-and-a-half stay. In Tobruk, Aldabaiba’s convoy was blocked by LNA sympathisers, including the war wounded, who asked the Prime Minister to salute a picture of Khalifa Haftar. The demonstration dispersed when Egaim intervened by affirming Haftar’s revered role.

Accompanied by Egaim, Aldabaiba met on 5 July with figures from eastern tribes, such as the Magharba, the Obeidat, Amnafa and, most importantly, Awaqeir, who travelled from the Benghazi area for this purpose. The Awaqeir harbour some grievances towards Aldabaiba after the latter made negative comments regarding Benghazi and the LNA in the presence of their rival Shura council members a few months ago. Although Aldabaiba has apologised for these ‘unfortunate words,’ the pro-LNA faction in the east, and the Awaqeir in particular, who fought the Shura council during the Benghazi War (2014-2017), have sharply criticised the Prime Minister (depicted as anti-LNA and pro-Shura), further complicating the prospect of Aldabaiba’s long-awaited visit to Benghazi. During this meeting, Aldabaiba reiterated his apologies and has seemingly buried the hatchet with the pro-LNA tribal representatives, including the Awaqeir. It is worth noting that the GNU is relying on select Awaqeir figures to maintain some semblance of authority in the east, and Benghazi in particular, where LNA’s headquarters are located.

8 Tuareg Moulay Odeixi, a rival of the Council of Tuareg Elders in Libya, signed the charter on behalf of the Tuareg community.
9 The steering councils are municipal boards appointed during the period of institutional divisions between the GNA and the LNA-aligned Interim Government. These were created to counterbalance the authority of the rival government at the local level. The Steering Council of Murzuq was appointed by the GNA and dominated by the Tebu, while the elected LNA-aligned mayor was from the Ahali community, the Tebu’s local rival. For further details on the Tebu-Ahali rivalry in Murzuq and elsewhere, see Libya Monthly Context report, 30 June 2021.
10 In an informal gathering with Benghazi Shura council members exiled in Tripoli, the Prime Minister said that Benghazi is one again part of the nation, suggesting that this was not the case under the LNA, prior to the GNU’s rule.
It seems Aldabaiba is pursuing a strategy similar to the one he adopted with the Awaqeir in Benghazi (the largest eastern city) in Tobruk, the second largest city in the east, located close to the Egyptian border. Aldabaiba is attempting to play into tribal politics by building an alliance with the area’s dominant tribe, the Obeidat and, to a lesser extent, the Amnafa, at the expense of al-Guta’an and other minor communities who are closer to the LNA. Not only is the Obeidat in control of large territories and strategic facilities — it is also the biggest tribe in the eastern region, followed by the Magharba (near Ajdabiya and the Oil Crescent) and the Awaqeir. It is clear that Obeidat figures (particularly belonging to the Maryam sub-tribe) helped arrange the logistics of the Prime Minister’s visit to Tobruk. Likewise, Aldabaiba has been hosted by the al-Mabri family, notables of the Obeidat tribe, in the presence of the mayor of Tobruk, Faraj Bulkhattabiya al-Obaidi. According to COAR’s interviews with primary sources, Aldabaiba asked the Obeidat to exert pressure on their fellow tribesman, Aguila Saleh, head of the HoR, to facilitate the adoption of the national budget.

Aldabaiba met with the second tribe in the region, the Amnafa, the day after his talks with the Obeidat. The two tribes have local and national interests to preserve as well as government positions, and are keen to see the GNU prevail in order to safeguard them, unlike rival tribes such as al-Guta’an. The latter, close to the LNA, has not enjoyed such power under the GNU, further exacerbating the tribal divisions in the Tobruk region, notably with the Obeidat.

11 Such as the areas between the cities of Derna, al-Qubba, and Tobruk (including its ports) and the Egyptian border.

12 The Amnafa are represented by Mohamed al-Menfi, the head of the Presidential Council, and the Obeidat by a number of GNU cabinet ministers.

Tribes in eastern Libya
Impact

Any dispute in the near future between the LNA and the GNU may be mirrored within the city of Tobruk between tribes such as al-Guta’an and Obeidat, whose relationship is already tense.

When Salih Rajab al-Mismari, a Gaddafi regime dignitary now close to the LNA, visited Tobruk, he contributed to this dynamic. In his capacity as head of the Murabatin Tribes Association, of which Amnafa and al-Guta’an are members (Obeidat are not), al-Misrami is attempting to impede the Amnafa’s rapprochement with the GNU while reportedly formulating strategies to loosen the Obeidat’s grip on Tobruk (a reality often bemoaned by al-Guta’an). It is worth noting the LNA has been increasingly empowering the Murabatin’s components at the expense of the major eastern tribes, including the Obeidat.

Benghazi

Benghazi has witnessed many security incidents over the past month. Mohamed al-Kani, the notorious leader of a Tarhouna armed group (known as al-Kaniyat) who fought alongside the LNA during the Tripoli war (April 2019-June 2020), was killed by security forces in Benghazi upon his return from abroad. With his brother Abdelrahim reportedly on the run, the LNA seized al-Kaniyat’s military equipment, cutting its embarrassing ties with the unsavoury armed group leaders who have been prosecuted for many crimes allegedly committed in Tarhouna.

Who is Mohamed al-Kani?

Along with his brothers, Mohamed al-Kani (the eldest) led the notorious armed group al-Kaniyat, which controlled the western city of Tarhouna, 90 km south of Tripoli, with an iron hand between 2013 to 2020. Al-Kaniyat formed an alliance with the LNA on the eve of its offensive on the capital (April 2019-May 2020). When the GNA forces succeeded in entering Tarhouna in late May 2020, al-Kaniyat and their followers left their home city for the eastern region as the LNA withdrew from the western frontlines. Although some integration measures were taken, al-Kaniyat were never incorporated into the LNA forces. Today, the remaining Kani brothers are hunted by various national and international entities (including for crimes against humanity) in connection with atrocities committed during their rule of Tarhouna, where new mass graves continue to be discovered.

The GNU’s Deputy Minister of Interior, Faraj Egaim, has overseen the formation of Benghazi’s new security body, the Law Enforcement Force. Colonel Jamal al-A’mami, the commander of the Benghazi’s Emergency Police, one of the few efficient and popular security bodies in Benghazi, was appointed at its head. The newly formed Law Enforcement Force is mainly made up of Jalam al-A’mami’s Emergency Police and the Faraj Egaim-led Counter-Negative Phenomena Agency (CNPA), in addition to the Criminal Investigation Department under the Benghazi Security Directorate.

Following initial operations in Benghazi, including against drug dealers in the ungoverned district of al-Waheishi on 26 July, Jamal al-A’mami was shot and wounded in action on the 28th. He recovered a few days after undergoing surgery for his injuries.

Meanwhile, on 30 July, the Libyan Red Crescent’s Benghazi emergency team buried eight unidentified bodies recently discovered in the city. This is not the first time that bodies have been discovered across Benghazi, some of which were casualties of the Benghazi War (2014-2018), while others had been executed. Only this year, dozens of bodies have been found in Benghazi, either in mass graves or by the roadside, particularly in March.

13 The Murabatin constitute the lower stratum in the eastern tribal hierarchy, and are composed of several minor tribes, such as al-Masamir, Amnafa, al-Guta’an, and al-Furjan (Haftar’s own tribe) – among dozens others. The Obeidat, the Awaqeir, and the Magharba, etc. are considered relatively aristocratic.

14 Benghazi’s Law Enforcement Force (Quwat Fardh al-Qanun) should not be confused with the Law Enforcement Force Directorate (Idarat Quwat Infadh al-Qanun) affiliated with the Minister of Interior’s General Administration of Security operations in the western region.