Meanwhile, a group of outside expert investigators, led by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, has urged 57 countries to repatriate their nationals, including families of suspected IS fighters, from “squalid camps” in northeast Syria. The appeal singles out at least 13 EU member states, the U.S., and the UK. The experts noted that camp residents are exposed to “violence, exploitation, abuse and deprivation in conditions and treatment that may well amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under international law.” According to the statement, an unverified number of camp residents have died “because of their conditions of detention.” The expert panel expressed concern over limits on humanitarian access to the camps and the emphasis on security-forward approaches, including in data collection, which has raised concerns over a duty of care toward beneficiaries.

Conditions in al-Hol camp, resident repatriation, and potential deradicalisation interventions are matters of paramount concern for the international aid community and for local authorities in northeast Syria. By mid-January, a reported 12 killings in the camp evinced an alarming deterioration in internal conditions that has evidently persisted (see: Syria Update 1 February 2021). There is cause for concern that violence in al-Hol will beget further violence. Approximately 35 people were killed in the camp in all of 2020. Reports of beheadings — which have yet to be confirmed by sources outside the Self-Administration’s sphere of influence — are especially notable. If confirmed, such incidents would bear the hallmark of IS-linked actors. Yet, it is crucial to approach such reports with caution. Though a very real threat in its own right, IS has long been a rhetorical focus of northeast Syria officials keen to secure the international community’s support for a swift resolution to the situation in al-Hol camp.

As of October 2020, al-Hol, the largest displaced persons camp in northeast Syria, hosted approximately 64,619 residents, mainly women and children. Syrians and Iraqis account for 85 percent of residents, while other foreign nationals accounted for 15 percent of residents at that time. Repeated calls for the camp’s dissolution prompted the SDF to announce its intention to clear and release all Syrian families sheltering there late in October (see: Syria Update 12 October 2020). However, since that announcement, it is estimated that only 500 residents have left al-Hol. Although the SDF has advertised its efforts to ease resident return, including reportedly ending tribal-sponsorship requirements, myriad impediments remain. For many residents, dismal conditions in communities of origin mean they are unwilling or unable to return. Many Syrian camp residents originally from Deir-ez-Zor, for instance, are unable to return to their home communities because their houses have been destroyed, basic services are extremely limited, and livelihood opportunities are virtually nonexistent. That some of these same communities lie adjacent to northeast Syria’s oil wealth has only sharpened the local population’s sense of grievance, creating further risks in those communities, inside al-Hol, and across the Self-Administration more widely. Meanwhile, widespread concerns over the humanitarian situation in al-Hol camp persist, amid fears of IS resurgence and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Tafas, Dar’a Governorate: Local and media sources have indicated that, on 8 February, the Central Negotiations Committee and the 4th Division reached an agreement to end the recent military escalation in western Dar’a Governorate (see: Syria Update 1 February 2021). With Russian mediation, the Western Central Committee (a group of notables from western Dar’a) and the Security Committee (a group comprised of Syrian Arab Army, including the 4th Division, and various intelligence service actors) hammered out an agreement allowing the 4th Division to search farms and confiscate medium weapons, provided no one is arrested in the process. Notably, the agreement forestalls the need to exile any wanted individuals to northern Syria, a key demand previously made by the Government of Syria. Nonetheless, the 4th Division has continued to expand its physical presence, mobility, and authority in western Dar’a, installing new checkpoints, opening new headquarters, and controlling important road access in the area. In another clear indication of its expanding influence, the 4th Division is now able to levy taxes on local militias’ smuggling operations.

The 4th Division’s approach to western Dar’a has been predicated on consistent application of pressure, maximalist threats, and patience as it has secured piecemeal agreements to expand its presence. Local sources note that the latest agreement came only after the 4th Division had obtained its apparent objectives by installing checkpoints and gaining control over main roads in the area. Meanwhile, a narrative circulating within Dar’a suggests that the latest deal is a success that will prevent a violent flare-up indefinitely. The true impact of the bargain is unlikely to be felt in the immediate term. However, it is distinctly possible that the 4th Division will find itself on surer footing when regional unrest flares. It is possible that the deal will result in a superficial restoration of key government institutions in western Dar’a, but the most meaningful impact on the ground is likely to be the expansion of the 4th Division’s security presence and influence.

Damascus: On 10 February, Government of Syria Military and Criminal Security branches raided several markets in Damascus city, including al-Hariqa, al-Hamidiyah, and Marjeh, arresting 30 people for trading in U.S. dollars. Media sources reported that the raids targeted electronics and phone shops, which are notorious for dealing in foreign currencies due to the import-based nature of their industry. However, hawala and exchange offices were reportedly spared during the raids. Some of the arrested were charged with “spreading rumours” about exchange rates and the devaluation of the Syrian pound. Meanwhile, the pound plummeted to its lowest value on record, sinking to 3,300 SYP/USD on the black market, as of writing.

Hmeimim, Lattakia Governorate: On 8 February, media sources reported that new satellite imagery shows significant expansion at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase, near Jablah in Lattakia Governorate. The images indicated that a major runway was set to be extended by at least 1,000 feet (305 m) to accommodate larger aircraft. Relatedly, on 4 February, the Institute for the Study of War cited social media reports in a “low-confidence warning” that Belarusian forces would deploy to Syria in a “peacekeeping” capacity in September 2021.

Moscow’s Syria strategy is more ambiguous and reactive than many analysts of the conflict realise. Among Russia’s objectives, only its interest in buttressing the Government of Syria is beyond debate. That said, the conflict has furnished Russia with clear strategic gains. These include opportunities to develop new military capacities, to test new tactics, and to demonstrate the weapons systems that are the backbone of the Russian arms industry. Access to the Mediterranean, from Hmeimim, is also a clear spoil of the Syria war. Whether Hmeimim’s longer runway will accommodate aircraft supporting operations in Syria — or elsewhere in the region — will be a key question going forward. The current expansion is clear-cut evidence that Russia seeks to hold the site as a forward military installation in perpetuity.

Local reports of potential Belarusian deployments to Syria are doubtful at best. Russia has leveraged regional partners and its own ethnic minority populations to advance its goals in Syria in the past. However, reports of Belarusian “peacekeeping” deployments to support Russian activity in Syria have previously arisen, and no such “peacekeepers” have materialised. If true, such a deployment would more likely reflect the eagerness of a growing Russian ally (Lukashenko’s Belarus) than any discernible objective of the Kremlin’s in Syria. There is little credible evidence to support the latest claims.

The nonrecognition of higher education certificates has been one of the main challenges for medical students in northern Syria. Indeed, all of the area’s medical schools have, thus far, failed to obtain international recognition — these schools include those of the Free University of Aleppo (based in Mare’) and the University of Idleb. Turkish institutions are the favored choice for Syrian students who seek a recognised certificate. Previously, no Turkish universities with branches inside Syria offered medical degrees, although nursing qualifications were available. Establishing a branch of the University of Health Sciences in Ar-Ra’ee is a step toward improving the quality of medical education in northern Syria and increasing graduate’ access to job opportunities inside Syria and abroad (particularly in Turkey). Currently, holders of medical certificates from Government of Syria–run universities can undertake four years of specialised training through the Syrian Board of Medical Specialties (SBoMS), which allows them to work in their specialties inside Syria. However, it is not clear if the graduates of medical schools in opposition-controlled areas — such as al-Shamal Private University and al-Shahbaa Aleppo University — will have access to this training, given that denial of credentials is a key pressure tactic employed by Damascus to undermine areas outside its control.

The muddy dynamics of the education sector in northwest Syria are largely a reflection of the region’s split governance and military landscape. Meeting the salary needs of educators has proven difficult for international donors, especially given that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) controls large portions of the northwest. Although some of the striking schools are in HTS-controlled areas, interference by the HTS-affiliated Salvation Government has traditionally been limited to requiring permits for educational properties and (usually unsuccessful) attempts to influence the selection of teachers for courses on Islam. More challenging is the fact that teacher salaries in northwest Syria come from a variety of sources, including INGOs, the Government of Syria Ministry of Education, the Turkish Ministry of Education, and local NGOs. Although no schools in northwest Syria are managed exclusively by the Government of Syria Ministry of Education, in many schools, teachers continue to receive salaries from the Government of Syria. They work alongside teachers who draw salaries from the SIG Free Directorate of Education, which ultimately manages all schools. Schools with split funding streams for teacher salaries are most common in southern Idleb Governorate. In general, Government of Syria support for salaries is less common in areas in which HTS exercises greater influence.

Teachers have gone on strike over funding in the past. Such strikes have been seen as deft public broadsides to prompt international donors, such as UNICEF, to provide support. Risks to donors and NGOs stem from the potential public relations fallout of such events. Far more urgent is the need for students to continue receiving an education. A prolonged halt in education programming will have a significant impact on the development of a region that has already sustained significant blows to its infrastructure and human capital.